8145 de.45

AN

HUMBLE ADDRESS

TO THE

MOST HIGH, MOST MIGHTY, AND MOST PUISSANT,

THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.

———Man, proud Man,
(Dreſt in a little *brief* authority,
Moſt ignorant of what he's *moſt aſſured*,
His glaſſy *Eſſence*) like an *angry Ape*,
Plays ſuch fantaſtic tricks before high heaven,
As make the angels weep.

SHAKESPEARE.

PRINTED BY I. COLLES, No. 8, COPE-STREET.

M. DCC. XCIII.

BRITISH MUSEUM
20
55
JAN

AN

HUMBLE ADDRESS, &c.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

SO accuſtomed have you been at all times to flattery, that I fear the ſimple language of honeſty and truth may ſound diſloyal and treaſonous in your ears; yet I do ſolemnly declare and proteſt, that you have not a more loyal, a more true, or a more faithful ſubject, and that ſuch expreſſions in this humble Addreſs as ſhall appear wanting in reſpect, are applied only to your Majeſty's miniſters.

And I do here, in the beginning, profeſs, teſtify, and declare, my political faith to be, that all power, ſovereignty, and dominion in the empire of this globe, commonly called the world, is actually, and by right, veſted in you, ſave only ſo far as certain natural and hereditary enemies of your Majeſty, called wolves, tygers, bears, and lions, have wreſted part of it from you.

After this declaration, your Majeſty cannot ſuſpect me of diſaffection; let me therefore boldly proceed to tell you ſome wholeſome truths, and to inform you of what matters are going forward in various parts of your dominions.

There have been in all ages, and they never abounded more than in the preſent, a certain claſs of men who are known by a violent outcry againſt corruption,---againſt the abuſe of power,---againſt kings, and princes, and courtiers, and placemen, and penſioners,---who are, notwithſtanding, the moſt baſe, knaviſh, falſe, corrupt, paraſites, ſycophants, and flatterers,---telling your majeſty a thouſand lies of your ſovereign and omnipotent power, in order to obtain a ſhare in the adminiſtration of affairs, though at the ſame time they laugh in ſecret at your credulity.

But, while theſe courtiers and ſycophants profeſs allegiance to your majeſty, and cry aloud that your empire is in danger, they go about through every diſtrict of your Majeſty's dominions, uſing various falſe and artful means to excite the ſeveral inhabitants therein to ſet up their claims to the title of ſovereignty. One time they tell the people of France that they alone are the ſovereign people; then they endeavour to perſuade the people of England to believe the ſame; then they employ miſſionaries to inſtruct the ſans-culottes of Ireland that ſovereignty is veſted in them; and theſe deluded men are weak enough to believe them, and ſeal their belief with their blood.



Your

Your Majeſty therefore muſt ſee, that this is nothing leſs than a wicked attempt to diſmember your empire; as the Sovereign Majeſty of the People exiſts, not in any one arbitrary ſubdiviſion of the earth, but has been handed down undivided from Adam, your illuſtrious predeceſſor, to his children. And mark what has been the conſequence of thoſe doctrines. The people of that part of your dominions called France, have had the impudence and arrogance lately, contrary to their true allegiance, to declare, that the ſovereignty is veſted in them alone, and have actually called upon all other people, nations, and languages, to bow down and worſhip the wooden idol and ſhapeleſs image of government, defiled with the gore of human victims, which they have ſet up. They give indeed this choice; accept our kiſs of fraternity, they cry, or we will cut your throats.

Theſe prevaricators tell you, that you are omnipotent; that your will is the law of nature; and that your power is the meaſure of your will. Now I tell you, that your power, if united in any country, is indeed irreſiſtible; but that power cannot be united, without collecting the united will; and in order to diſcover that will, you muſt ſurrender your power into the hands of certain agents, called popular leaders; and, when that power is ſurrendered, your leaders, and not you, are ſovereigns. The conſequence therefore of revolutions, is not a reſtoration of power to the people, but a transfer of power from the hands

of

of one party into the hands of another party, which has gained the aſcendant. Your will, when you ſubmit yourſelves to act under a leader, is what that leader ſhall pleaſe to interpret. You cannot act without ſubmitting to a leader; and, *when* you ſubmit to a leader, you are neceſſarily betrayed.

I am bound by my allegiance to account to your Majeſty for my conduct. I have oppoſed thoſe falſe ſupporters of your ſovereign power, becauſe I hold them to be the worſt enemies of your rightful dominion. I ſhall therefore briefly ſtate the grounds and principles upon which I reaſoned, and the arguments which I offered.

A kind of delirium ſeemed lately to have poſſeſſed the minds of men. Strange events had taken place in the political world, and thoſe events gave riſe to ſtranger expectations. Mankind confidently looked up to a NEW ORDER OF THINGS, as at hand; and in the enthuſiaſtic proſpect of this *political millennium*, rejected the old ſyſtems not founded on the Sovereignty of the People, Equality, and the Rights of Man, as heretical. Whatever evils they ſaw reſulting from the revolutionary ſyſtem, they conſidered as inevitable; and, in the perſuaſion of this, they ſeemed diſpoſed to anticipate their approach, and to meet them more than half way. Thomas Paine ſtood forward as the Apoſtle of this new creed, and pointed out the National Aſſembly as the Præcurſors of his miſſion.

The

The doctrines of the Rights of Man are ſaid to be founded in the nature and origin of man (1); that all men are equal by nature; that the earth is the common inheritance of all; and that each man therefore is entitled to a certain portion of the earth as his inheritance. Some authors have ſaid that this portion is no more than each man can cultivate. I will ſuppoſe, however, that the lot of each is to be meaſured by the number of individuals amongſt whom the unoccupied part is to be diſtributed. It cannot exceed this meaſure (2).

Paine muſt hold one of theſe two things,---either that upon the event of a Revolution, which he is pleaſed to call the ſtanding order of the day, property already acquired ſhall remain with the poſſeſſors, or that, upon a change of government, all acquired property

(1) There is nothing more obvious in the ſyſtems founded on the Rights of Man, than groſs ignorance of man, and of human nature. Nothing better indeed could have been expected from the founder of thoſe ſyſtems, that illuſtrious madman Rouſſeau (for Paine is but a plagiariſt from the Social Contract)—a man of the moſt brilliant imagination, but a recluſe, ſhunning ſociety, and flying to ſolitude and retirement from converſe with the world. I have ſeen a treatiſe on geography, for youth, which began thus; What is the world?—It is a globe, made of paſte-board.

"Thoſe who talk of a counter-revolution in France," ſays Paine, "ſhow how little they underſtand of man. There does not exiſt "in the compaſs of language an arrangement of words to expreſs "ſo much as the means of effecting a counter-revolution."

(2) Quemadmodum theatrum cum commune ſit, recte tamen dici poteſt, ejus eſſe eum locum quem quiſque occuparit.

CICERO de Fin. l. 3. c. 20.

perty muſt become the common and equal right of all. Now neither Paine nor any of his followers have been as yet hardy enough to aſſert the latter. I ſhall therefore aſſume it as a principle, that *upon the abolition of the government in any country by a revolution, the poſſeſſors of property have a right to retain their poſſeſſions* (1).

When Paine ſpeaks of the ſovereignty of the people, he muſt mean either the ſovereignty of the people at large, the multitude, in any country, or the ſovereignty of the poſſeſſors of property alone. (2) If he

(1) By *right* I mean, in the ſenſe of Puffendorff, a "power which was fairly got, and is as fairly poſſeſſed" Law of Nature and Nations, book I. ch. i. § 20. It is obviouſly different from *ſimple power*, which may be, to do wrong; and which, as Hobbes and Paine alledge, conſtitutes right: it is not a power of acting, in the full extent of our natural ſtrength and liberty, but of uſing both in ſuch a manner as is approved of by reaſon,—that is, while we enjoy our *own* property or poſſeſſions in the fulleſt extent, permitting others to enjoy theirs in like manner.

I object to the ſyſtem founded on Original Compact, and affecting to trace man in an imaginary progreſs from a ſtate of nature to ſociety; Firſt, the want of obligation of ſuch compact, if it ever did exiſt, on the deſcendants of the contractors; Secondly, that the inhabitants of any country at this day upon the face of the earth, are not deſcendants of the original contractors; Thirdly, that if there are any ſuch deſcendants exiſting in any country, they are the land proprietors, and not the people at large.

I take ſociety at that point of time, when a former exiſting government is diſſolved—the only actual ſtate in which ſociety can now be found neareſt to a ſtate of nature.

(2) "A vaſt maſs of mankind," ſays Paine, "are degradedly "thrown into the back ground of the human picture, to bring for-"ward with greaterglare the puppet-ſhow of ſtate and ariſtocracy." —"It is not among the leaſt of the evils of the preſent exiſting go-

vern-

he means the ſupreme power of thoſe who have no property over the acquired property of others, in making laws, or framing or altering a conſtitution, either according to the beſt judgment they can form, or their pleaſure, he ſubverts the natural rights of man, which he affects to vindicate,---becauſe, even in a ſtate of nature, each man has a right to acquire property, and to diſpoſe of or govern it as he thinks proper, according to his beſt judgment (with this only reſtraint, permitting others to do the ſame as to their acquiſitions)---although he may be compelled to go into a ſtate of ſociety, to ſecure the exerciſe of that right.

The ſovereignty of the earth is veſted in two claſſes of people, in the proprietors of land, and the non-proprietors (1); that is, in all countries redeemed from

vernments in all parts of Europe, that man, conſidered as man, is thrown back to a vaſt diſtance from his Maker, and the artificial chaſm filled up by a ſucceſſion of barriers, or a ſet of turnpike gates, through which he has to paſs."

(1) By proprietors of land I mean all perſons who have any permanent intereſt in or iſſuing out of land; either direct, as lords paramount of the ſoil, or derivative, as holding under them.—I would include leaſehold intereſts of a certain term.

There cannot be an excluſive right to property, which is a *jus utendi et diſponendi*, without an excluſive right to power over that property. Exeluſive power over property includes excluſive management, government, conſtitution, regulation; that is, excluſive political power in framing, altering, modifying, the government, conſtitution, and laws, in the caſe of landed property, of ſuch portion of the earth, that is, of the country, where ſuch property lies.

from a ſtate of nature, the præoccupying proprietors are the ſovereign and the non-proprietors in ſuch countries have their ſovereign rights to a ſubdiviſion of the unoccupied and vacant poſſeſſions of the earth; but

It is ſcarcely neceſſary to obſerve, that this rightful power in any thing cannot juſtify a miſuſe of ſuch thing; much leſs a miſuſe of any power ariſing from ſuch thing by uſurpation of power over the property or perſons of others; as in making one law for the legiſlators, and another for the people. The Spartan proprietors were no more juſtified in their treatment of the Helots, or the Poliſh nobles of the Peaſants, than the Helots or Peaſants would have been juſtified in making laws to govern the property of their maſters—but ſuch miſuſe of power could never be in any community where the government itſelf is obliged to obey the laws which bind the ſubjects.—There cannot be property in a thing in one man, and power to govern, manage, controul, or order that property in another, who has no common intereſt in the thing, or in things of like nature.———There may be ſuperior wiſdom and virtue caſually in the non-proprietor, but that will not give even a temporary right to govern the property of the proprietor; becauſe there is no common or impartial judge on earth to determine this; and ſecondly, ſuperior wiſdom and virtue in one man, give no right to diſpoſe of property in which he has not even a common intereſt; becauſe the proprietor is a free agent, and therefore entruſted with the uſe and abuſe of power, and reſponſible for a violation of the laws of nature, to the Author of Nature alone, and not to an individual who has no right or intereſt in the property abuſed.

If you once give the people powers in the name of rights to which they have no title, in order to make inſtruments of them to correct the abuſes of power, it is in vain to ſet limits to wrong, or to ſay, thus far ſhall you go and no farther; they will continue to exerciſe power in the name of right until all right is overturned, and power and anarchy alone bear ſway.

but they have no more right, or title, or ſovereignty over the territory acquired by the poſſeſſors, than one individual in a ſtate of nature has over the tree planted, or the field cultivated by his neighbour.

In a ſtate of nature all men, in certain reſpects, may be ſaid to be equal in rights and powers; becauſe no man has excluſive property in more than he occupies and poſſeſſes. Each man therefore having equal rights and poſſeſſions, has an equal Intereſt in a ſociety to be formed, and therefore an equal right to a voice in the conſtitution of the government for ſuch ſociety as any number may agree to adopt. In a ſtate of ſociety already formed, but whoſe government is diſſolved, all men are *not* equal, becauſe the ſoil is already occupied and poſſeſſed by the few, who have different rights therefore from the many; and thoſe who have pre-occupied the territory, and are in poſſeſſion of the land, have the ſole right to chuſe for themſelves in what manner, and by what form of government and laws, they ſhall protect that property which they have acquired. The multitude, that is the people at large (taken *per capita*) the majority of whom in all countries are non-proprietors, have no right to dictate to the few poſſeſſed of property, or to conſtitute a form of government for them; though a thouſand to one in numbers, they do not weigh a feather in the balance; they have their rights of man, their patrimony unalienable; but thoſe rights are a title to vacant unoccupied poſſeſſions. What does the multitude conſiſt of? perſons

ſons who never had property, or who have transferred that property which they had to others. Now a man cannot at the ſame time transfer his property to another, and retain the power which ought to accompany ſuch property (1).

Upon a diſſolution of government in any country where property has been acquired, no title whatſoever accrues to the multitude, becauſe the landed property is præoccupied. The people at large, therefore gain nothing by ſuch a diſſolution of government, but they loſe what they had before; a title to protection in the gradual and progreſſive acquiſition of property. The deſpot multitude therefore, even when government is diſſolved, has no more right to make laws, to diſpoſe of the property I have acquired, than the ſingle deſpot has to deprive me of life or liberty; for the rightful power of "a nation in its original character," is nothing more than the collected ſtrength of the occupiers of the land.

There is a great want of preciſion in the uſe of the term *the people*, even in writers of eminence; when the truſt is abuſed, ſay they, it devolves upon thoſe who gave it, *the people*---no doubt---but the people *at large* never repoſed any truſt, becauſe government is

(1) The Cruſades have been called an attempt to gain Heaven without piety. The South-Sea project was a Cruſade to gain *property* without *induſtry*; and the Rights of Man were a Cruſade to obtain *power* without *property*.

is ſet up, not by the general conſent of the people at large (unleſs in a ſociety actually emerging from a ſtate of nature) but by the proprietors of the country; and the repreſentatives cannot be poſſeſſed of any power of which the perſons who delegate are not poſſeſſed; therefore the powers of the ſociety upon a breach truſt in the repreſentatives devolve upon the ſpecial occupants of the ſoil where ſuch government is eſtabliſhed who gave the power, not upon the people at large.

Land proprietors have the ſole right of making laws to affect the perſonal ſafety of Land owners, and therefore, of all perſons who chooſe to ſeek protection by remaining in their community; ſince laws which protect all muſt bind all.----The proprietors of landed property alone have a *common intereſt* in every ſpecies of property which can be enjoyed by man; and therefore are alone entitled to make laws which ſhall govern all property. To give to the poſſeſſor of property in perſonal things only, a power to make laws to govern *all property*, would be to give a power to the non-proprietor of land, to govern the landed intereſts of others, that is a power to govern property, in which he had not a common intereſt with others, that is ſelf-aſſumed, or deſpotic power over the property of others.

All power emanates from *landed* property, it is the parent of *all* property; and therefore I ſpeak, as if there was no *other kind* of property. The landed proprietor however, if he is wiſe, will encourage trade, arts,

arts, manufactures, commerce; he will therefore endeavour to give a *permanent reſidence* to theſe by granting a ſhare in political power, in privileges, immunities, and franchiſes, to corporate bodies.----It is his intereſt to do ſo, and if he chuſes to abuſe his power for a time, he will be taught wiſdom and virtue by ſuffering----but if he does not uſe his power to the beſt purpoſe for a time, I will rather wait the inſtructions of that teacher Experience, whoſe leſſons are founded on ſelf-intereſt, than juſtify the uſurpation of power in the people at large, as teachers of wiſdom and virtue by wrong and violence.

See then the radical falſehood upon which the whole ſyſtem of Paine and others is founded; that the ſupreme power in every country is veſted not in the Land-holders, who are already occupants of the territory for which laws are to be made, or a conſtitution to be framed, but in the people at large who have no property, poſſeſſion, or title, except their "high and "only title of Man"---that is, each man by natural right is entitled to a certain portion of this habitable globe, and therefore in that ſovereign right, if he chuſes to ſave himſelf the trouble to cultivate his patrimony, the unoccupied parts of the earth, he may ſit down on the cultivated and appropriated ſoil of another, if he has perſuaded himſelf that he poſſeſſes more wiſdom and virtue than the proprietor, and make laws for him. This is ſuch rank nonſenſe, that if it were not wrapt up in proud unmeaning metaphyſical jargon, reaſon would revolt at it.

The

The great object of ſociety is the preſervation of property, becauſe the acquiſition of property, and the protection of it when acquired, are the inducements to incite, and the means to cultivate thoſe talents which render life deſirable. A form of Government framed by ſages, and adminiſtered by angels, which did not contribute to the comforts and conveniences of life, which did not tend to enhance the enjoyments of intellect, and the rational pleaſures of ſenſe in our ſhort ſpan of threeſcore and ten years, ought to be rejected. Government is inſtituted for the common ſecurity of the natural rights of every individual (1)

C the

(1) The people at large conſiſt of proprietors and non-proprietors, the latter is a quantity perpetually fluctuating; it may be one day 100,000, next day 100, next day 10;—again it may conſiſt of 100,000 perſons, but thoſe perſons totally unconnected with the former, and having directly *oppoſite* intereſts.—According to the mathematical rigour of demonſtration, therefore, I take the continually varying ſeries at its fixed limit.—I ſay the people at large are ultimately reſolved into the permanent proprietors, and that is a *good* conſtitution which is formed according to *their* beſt intereſts, and not according to the *temporary* or *imaginary* intereſts (for their *real* intereſt would be to ſecure that permanent property which it ought to be the end and aim of their induſtry one day to acquire) of paſſengers, ſojourners, reſidents, and non-proprietors;—and that is a *free conſtitution*, where the laws *bind all* and *protect all*; the *tranſient* ſtranger as well as the *permanent* proprietor; *legiſlators* as well as *legiſlated*;—in this alone conſiſts *political liberty*.—Put the caſe of an inundation of a multitude of foreigners into any country.—I only wiſh to lead men to think, for it would be impoſſible in a work of this nature to point out all the falſe and dangerous conſequences ariſing from any ſyſtem which violates this plain principle;—*that no man can have a rightful power to interfere in the government of*

any

the non-proprietors of property are equally protected as to life and perſonal liberty, with the proprietor of property; for the general protection of life and perſonal liberty is the neceſſary reſult of the protection of property, as it is impoſſible to enjoy a complete protection of the latter without the former, it being immaterial whether the property be taken from the poſſeſſor or the poſſeſſor from the property. The ſtrongeſt inducements to the acquiſition of wealth, and the cultivation of talents are held out by annexing the right of power to property alone. If the non-proprietors however, chuſe to forego thoſe advantages, their rights of men are unimpeached, they may quit ſuch ſociety and retire to their ſovereign dominions in the unoccupied parts of the earth.

It may be ſaid, that this ſyſtem excludes talents. I anſwer, that talents, if uſeful, will ſooner or later obtain wealth, and the injury is leſs to ſociety to be deprived of the political power, (for their aſſiſtance may ſtill be obtained) of a Bacon, a Locke, or a Newton, if men of no property, than to give to any thing elſe *but* property an influence over property.

It is not therefore, becauſe the multitude are likely to abuſe their rights, that I deny them power. Such rights

any thing, unleſs he has a common intereſt with the proprietor, by poſſeſſing things of like nature himſelf;---and therefore, *that ſuperior wiſdom in the non-proprietor, abuſe of power in the proprietor, impreſcriptible right founded in imaginary primæval contract, give no title to power over the excluſive property of another.*

rights as nature or ſociety gave them, let them enjoy. It is not upon any narrow principle of prudential policy; no, *fiat juſtitia ruat cælum*; but I deny their rights except to perſonal protection, which is an adequate recompence given by ſociety for their ſervices. What is protection? It is the ſuccour given by the few to the many. How are the few enabled to yield that ſuccour? By inequality; by the aggregate of power in them. If all men were equal there could be no protection. Now, I ſay, the only ſenſe in which all men *are* equal, is in the equal right to protection; but that neceſſarily preſuppoſes an inequality in power, and therefore an inequality in the right of making laws, and therefore an inequality in the choice of delegates to make laws, or to conſtitute, or alter a form of government.

The criterion of property is the poſſeſſion of that from whence flows directly or indirectly all property; a certain intereſt in *land*. But power ſhould be annexed only to ſuch property as is viſible, oſtenſible, impoſſible to be removed or concealed, and theſe qualities are found in landed property alone. The proprietors therefore of land in any kingdom, ſtate or empire, have the ſole right of electing or changing the form of government therein; all others are but ſojourners, or tenants at ſufferance, entitled to protection while they ſtay, but if they diſlike the government formed by the few, at liberty to claim their patrimony, and to ſet up ſuch government, as they

ſhall

ſhall think proper for themſelves in any part of their unappropriated ſovereign dominions.

I admit the rights of the people (meaning thereby the proprietors of the territory or the land-holders) of any country, by the conſent of the majority to alter upon ſufficient grounds, or to annihilate the conſtitution under which they live (3). I deny the rights of the people (meaning thereby the multitude conſiſting of non-proprietors, though conſtituting a majority to any amount) to alter the conſtitution, much more to annihilate the conſtitution, or to form a new con-

(3) I have great reſpect for the opinions of Locke, but I apprehend he has uſed expreſſions too looſe and general in his Eſſay on Government, which are liable therefore, to be greatly miſunderſtood, or miſrepreſented.——"The fundamental law of nature, ſays Locke, being the preſervation of mankind, no human ſanction can be good or valid againſt it, and the municipal laws of countries are only ſo far right as they are founded on the laws of nature."—If he means by this, that legiſlators can never acquire a right by the will of any body of people to violate the obvious laws of nature in ſuch inſtances, where the voice of nature herſelf muſt exclaim at the act; as to reward murder, or to puniſh mercy—there is no queſtion of this—but if he ſpeaks of thoſe poſitive laws or inſtitutions of civil ſociety, which are neither *mala* nor *bona in ſe* but in their effects and conſequences only, on which the wiſeſt and beſt men will differ.—I aſk what is to be the criterion of their goodneſs or obligation?—their agreement with the law of nature? —What is the criterion of their agreement with the law of nature? ********** *hiatus valde deflendus!*—Who is the common and impartial judge, and interpreter of the law of nature?—No ſuch perſon being diſcoverable, has every man a right to erect a tribunal in his own breaſt, and to determine whether the powers that rule act according to the law of nature and ought to be obeyed?

conſtitution, or to make laws, or to chuſe delegates to make laws to govern property not their own; for ſuch ſelf-aſſumed power is the very eſſence of deſpotiſm (4).

Power ought to be attached to property in land alone, and not to perſonal property, for this reaſon: the proprietor of land in making laws himſelf, or by his delegates, binds the land whether in his own hands or in the hands of any perſon who may derive a property from him. It is his intereſt therefore, to make ſuch laws, or to chuſe delegates to make ſuch laws, as ſhall protect property in general.---But the proprietor of perſonal property, if power be annexed to ſuch property, may affect the rights of others, may bind the property of others in general, and yet remain unbound and unaffected by the laws made by himſelf or his delegates; becauſe ſuch perſonal property may be concealed or transferred to another country, where no

(4) It is ſaid that there is an ultimate right of reſiſtance in the people—this is one of thoſe general expreſſions which are either true or falſe, according to the ſenſe in which they are uſed—the criterion of the right of that part of the people at large, called proprietors to reſiſt the eſtabliſhed government, is ſuch a breach of the truſt repoſed, as has a neceſſary tendency to ſubvert the conſtitution—the criterion of the right of the non-proprietors to reſiſt is very different—that right can only ariſe in one inſtance—ſuch an act of violence on the part of the government as ſubverts the firſt principles of *ſociety*, not barely of the conſtitution—eſtabliſhing one law for themſelves, and another for the non-proprietors—endangering their perſonal ſafety, ſo as to make reſiſtance their only reſource for ſelf-preſervation.

no ſuch laws exiſt, immediately after the poſſeſſor has exerciſed his power.

I do not ſay that property will have its weight in ſociety; but I ſay that nothing *but* property ought to have political weight in ſociety (5). I do not ſay that it is convenient to deprive the multitude of political power, becauſe they might make a bad uſe of it; but I ſay the multitude has no right or title by the laws of God, of nature, or of ſociety, to any ſhare in political power in any country where the territory is præoccupied. I do not ſay that if the rational will of the ſociety be already collected from the few, it is unneceſſary to take the ſenſe of the multitude; but I ſay that it is unjuſt to ſuffer the rational will to be affected by the will of parties, rational or irrational, who have no right to the ſubject matter in debate. I do not ſay that the multitude are ignorant and corrupt, and therefore ought not to be truſted; but I ſay, that if all wiſdom and virtue were confined to the multitude, and folly and vice for a time, to be found alone in the few, the poſſeſſors of property; the multitude would ſtill be a deſpot, if it dared to arrogate the power of making laws, or a conſtitution or a government for thoſe few (6).

If

(5) That is, permanent proprietors are the only *ſource* of political power, but if they are wiſe, they will permit that power to flow from them, and eſtabliſh the permanency of arts, commerce and manufactures, by granting political franchiſes.

(6) Abuſe of rightful power will correct itſelf in the preſent generation or their ſucceſſors, by the never-failing puniſhment which

If theſe principles be well founded, it is an idle diſcuſſion, whether a conſtitution ought to be produced in

which viſit ſuch abuſes, if thoſe who ſuffer, ſteadily remonſtrate. —Suppoſe the proprietors ſhould ſo far abuſe their powers as to uſurp an arbitrary unlimited right to diſpoſe of the lives of the non-proprietors; this would be a ſubverſion of equal law, and not barelyaſ ubverſion of government, but of ſociety; and therefore if the non-proprietors could not fly from ſuch power, exerciſed in the abuſe of right, they would have the right of ſelf-preſervation to reſiſt. I ſay, if they could not *fly*—for in the caſe of violence offered by one individual to another in a ſtate of nature, homicide is never juſtifiable but where the latter cannot by any poſſibility otherwiſe eſcape;—but if he can prevent the violence, or eſcape, he has no right to retaliate by violence on his part; that is, by arrogating power to govern the perſon or the property of the oppreſſor.

The radical vice of the French Revolution was this principle—the recognition of the rights of the people at large, (upon an abuſe of power in the few) to ſet up a good form of government for the community in a ſociety where there was appropriated excluſive property of a permanent nature. The conductors of that revolution in order to correct the abuſes of power, violated the rights of excluſive property, by plundering the proprietors, and transferring their property as an inſtrument of power into other hands; abſurdly hoping that the new proprietors of ſuch property obtained by force without right, would commit fewer exceſſes than the old proprietors who had at firſt rightfully obtained, but afterwards, in ſome inſtances, wrongfully exerciſed their power.---Surely order or good government could never ſpring from ſuch a ſyſtem of wrong and violence!----Anarchy was not the *probable*, but the *neceſſary* conſequence---the moſt *perfect ſuperſtructure* of government could not ſtand on ſuch a *baſis*. Revolutions and maſſacres followed each other ſo rapidly in that country, that the people have not had leiſure to go through the claſſes in the ſchool of adverſity in order to learn wiſdom---they will therefore, probably oſcillate from one extreme to another---now the tyranny of the multitude, then of the individual, then of the multitude; long before they ſubſide in any medium of good government.

in a viſible form---whether a conſtitution be the offſpring originally of conqueſt or of compact---whether a convention of the people might not chuſe a new conſtitution---what is the beſt manner to collect the ſenſe of the people at large---whether a government of leſs ſecurity might not be purchaſed at a cheaper rate---what is the moſt perfect Utopian government---whether a corrupt body can reform itſelf---whether publick clamours are the voice of the majority---all theſe are queſtions of the moſt abſolute inſignificance, ſo long as the proprietors of the permanent property in the country are ſatisfied with the laws and the conſtitution which govern their property, of which by the eternal rules of reaſon, the laws of nature, and the firſt principles of ſociety, they are the ſole judges (7).

A good repreſentative government therefore is not the organ of the will of the people at large, it is the *inſtrument of the rational will of the few*; that rational will is almoſt always at direct variance with the will of

(7) I am not anxious to derive the pedigree of our liberties from the Revolution.---I revere the Revolution and the form of government then eſtabliſhed; and poſterity ſo long as they are wiſe, will revere it as a great inſtitution of their anceſtors, tried and approved by the teſt of time;---but the conſtitution of any country is a fee-ſimple inheritance, not an eſtate in ſtrict ſettlement.---If the preſent owners or their poſterity are ſo unwiſe, they may undoubtedly ſquander that patrimony which has been depoſited in their hands as a ſacred truſt, more binding than legal obligation; but it would be monſtrous to ſuppoſe that the tenants on the lands have a right to limit or intail the fee or diſpoſe of the reverſion.

of the multitude. One great end of a good government, is to prevent the will of the multitude from being carried into effect. It is the duty of a good government even to oppoſe the will of the *few* (within the limits of their truſt) if inconſiſtent with reaſon---its buſineſs is to appeal, in ſuch caſes, from Philip intoxicated, to Philip ſober.

See how theſe plain principles will ſolve ſome of the great political queſtions which have lately occupied and ſtill continue to agitate the minds of the people. Three millions may be entitled to *favours* from one million, but their *numbers* can give them no manner of *right* to demand a participation in power with one million already poſſeſſed of the territory. That one million may limit, reſtrain, or monopolize their landed property ſo as to confine the future enjoyment to their deſcendants, who may in like manner exclude any particular deſcription of perſons, or encumber the property they chuſe to transfer to them with certain conditions; and even ſuppoſing ſuch uſe of excluſive property impolitick in the judgment of ſome men, as not conducing moſt to the intereſt of the poſſeſſors; yet to aſſert that the poſſeſſors are not juſtified in ſuch uſe of excluſive property, as ſhall be moſt likely to maintain the aſcendancy of perſons of the ſame deſcription with themſelves, ſuch prevalence being in their judgment moſt eſſential to the welfare of the community; or to contend that they are bound to relinquiſh that aſcendancy; is to overthrow the boundary between

appropriated poſſeſſions and rights in common, and to maintain the power of one man over the fruits of another man's labours. In like manner to aſſert that every individual who pays taxes, that is, who contributes to ſupport the ſociety which protects him, has a right to give his voice in the election of repreſentatives, is to contend that the right to protection alone gives a right to power, that is, a right to controul the property of others, without a reciprocal power in them; and this is nothing leſs than to maintain the power of a ſingle deſpot over the lives and fortunes of the people againſt their conſent; it is a war of indigence againſt induſtry and property. It is the deſpotiſm of the multitude, in which all the modern doctrines of Equality, Sovereignty of the People, and Rights of Man ultimately end.

That ſociety which ſhould be bold enough to ſay that no reform is wanting, would betray the ſtrongeſt neceſſity for reform. When I hear reform ſpoken of therefore, I ſay, it is a wiſe meaſure. When I hear of *radical* reform, I ſuſpend my judgment. When I am told that it means a reform of our conſtitution of parliament, upon a plan to be approved of by the ſenſe of the people at large, to be collected by their delegates in a convention---I reprobate the principle as a corrupt attempt, of which honeſt men may be dupes, to rob the poſſeſſors of property of their rights of nature, their rights of ſociety, and their rights of man. I reprobate it as founded in a ſpecious deluſive falſehood, artfully confounding two terms eſſentially

different

different, *the multitude* and *the people*. I renounce it as a radically baſe and wicked illuſion, concealing the ſtandard of deſpotiſm under the banners of liberty.

Suppoſe a houſe of commons returned upon this principle, that the repreſentatives were to be paid by the people; their ſalaries equal; all placemen, penſioners, and ſervants of the crown excluded. What would be the conſequence? perhaps an incorrupt houſe of commons, that is an *uninfluenced* repreſentation; but would there be any talents, any energy, any exertions?---no---all theſe ariſe from conteſt for ſtation, rank, præeminence, profit. Such is man, and it is the politicians buſineſs to uſe him ſuch as he is, not to ſuppoſe him what he is not. The orator who toils over the midnight lamp to ſtore his judgment with arguments, or his imagination with images, in order to rouſe the paſſions of the people by his eloquence; may have no other view, perhaps, while he talks of liberty and his country, but to make a better market of both, or to be bought off by a place or a penſion. It is a baſe motive; yet from that baſe motive reſults this advantage, that his country profits by the leſſons which his eloquence delivers with all the energy of truth, and the enthuſiaſm of indignant virtue. But what are we to expect from this incorrupt, uninfluenced houſe of commons, the hirelings of the people? to entitle them to their ſalaries, the members would no doubt attend the Seſſions; and (if not occupied in ſecret ſchemes to effect one common object, the uſurpation of all power)

er) ſleep on their peaceful benches. No loud clamours would be heard, (unleſs of ſervile adulation to their maſters) but all would be decorous, drowſy dullneſs: what was every man's buſineſs would be no man's buſineſs; and after the toils of a yawning ſeſſion, looking forward with impatience to its cloſe, and curſing the drudgery of office; they would return with rapture to their hounds, their horſes and their bottle.

Conſult the hiſtory of former times. Hiſtory it is ſaid, is philoſophy teaching by examples. The founders of antient republicks ſaw that it was impoſſible to eſtabliſh the equal rights of the multitude, without eſtabliſhing a community of poſſeſſions; either by perſuading the poſſeſſors of property to a voluntary ſurrender, or by an act of violence enforcing ſuch communion. Sparta and Athens are examples of this. At Rome indeed, the people were more moderate and wiſe (8); they were ſatisfied to be ruled, provided

(8) I ſpeak of Rome a republick—the government of Rome under Tiberius was the humble model, I ſuppoſe, of Marat and Roberſpiere. Tiberius having appeaſed the people by the death of Sejanus and the execution of a great number of his friends, found his appetite for confiſcations and blood more keen and by a *general gaol delivery, ſeptemberized* the accomplices of his favourite who were found in the priſons of the city, (not mocked indeed with the hope of protection and a fair trial) but accuſed of a conſpiracy with Sejanus and knowing their fate.—A book has been written in France to extenuate and juſtify the maſſacres of September, and to prove that although the horrible cruelties of that tyrant and monſter Louis the XVIth. might have hardened the

provided their rulers were Plebeian Magiſtrates, and not Patricians, Nobles, or Kings; yet it was neceſſary to keep them quiet with promiſes of an Agrarian law. By a certain mode alſo of collecting the votes by Centuries, the ſovereign mob was thrown into the back ground (9). Theſe inſtitutions (for the ſcourge of the world) gave the Roman republick ſtability and duration (10). Happily for mankind the French repub-

the hearts of the virtuous friends of Equality a little, yet that the *callous* would ſpeedily wear off under the benign influence of liberty; and though ſome few individuals, not more perhaps than 20,000 might have fallen by aſſaſſination within the ſpace of a few weeks, yet how much better this than the *Morſus amiſſæ Libertatis* if checked or prevented—thoſe were pardonable frailties of outraged patriotiſm rouſed by a provocation which human nature could not reſiſt, the enormous multitude of ſeven perſons found in the priſon of the Baſtile.—Tiberius had too much modeſty for this—hypocrite as he was, he did not talk of the glorious cauſe of the emancipation of mankind or watering the Tree of Liberty with blood.

A modern Tiberius or Semiramis of the North may improve in the arts of deſpotiſm from the inſtructions of a Sans-culottes in the ſyſtem of organization.

(9) Pliny ſays that whenever the Roman Augurs reported that an ox had ſpoke which was not uncommon among the ancient prodigies, the SENATE were preſently to ſit *ſub-dio*. I do not know whether there was any ſuch rule with reſpect to *aſſes*—if ſo the cuſtom of the houſe retiring when certain members are on their legs might be accounted for.

(10) The Athenian people conſiſted of three deſcriptions of perſons—freemen or citizens—ſojourners or ſtrangers—ſlaves or ſervants---no perſon had the rights of an Athenian citizen unleſs he

republick only imitated Athens and Rome in their vices; this "birth-ſtrangled babe," was mature in wickedneſs from the womb.

There are ſingular traits of reſemblance in the Athenian and French republicks. Fickleneſs, imbecillity, exceſſive vanity, cruelty and injuſtice; all far outdone indeed in the latter. At Athens it was uſual to prohibit the repeal of a law, under a penalty in the mover of ſuch repeal; this proceeded from a ſenſe of their levity and inconſtancy (11.) The propoſer of a law was liable to be tried, and puniſhed if the law was afterwards judged to be uſeleſs, or injurious

he could trace his deſcent from Athenians on the fathers and mothers ſide.---A ſtranger who intermeddled in the aſſemblies of the people was puniſhed with death.

Libanius Declam: 17 and 28.

(11) M. Buzot moved in the Convention and it was decreed, that whoever ſhould propoſe the reſtoration of monarchy ſhould ſuffer death.—We ſhall ſee the ſupporters of that reſolution cut off, and ſome form of monarchy reſtored again as a refuge, without venturing to recur to the primary aſſemblies or the people at large as the ſource of power.

At Athens it was prohibited under pain of death to move for a repeal of a law which appropriated certain funds to theatrical pantomimes and entertainments, or to apply thoſe funds, ſo ſquandered, to publick uſes in caſes of emergency——thus this, motley many headed tyrant fiddled while Greece was burning.---(See ſeveral inſtances in Demoſthenes againſt Leptines, and againſt Ariſtocrates)---like other tyrants Athens at laſt grew ſick of ſober inſtruction and liſtened to none but demagogues the hired penſioners of foreign princes, while Perſia, Sparta and Macedonia, had their avowed advocates in the Athenian Forum who flattered her vanities and gratified her inordinate extravagance and debauchery.

jurious (12). Tho' their form of government changed with the moon, yet they always ſpoke of its eternity. They talked of univerſal liberty, yet aimed at univerſal conqueſt (13). Their ingratitude to their ableſt generals and beſt ſupporters, after the moſt important ſervices, upon a momentary change of fortune unfavourable to their vain and wild expectations, frequently compelled their chiefs to ſeek refuge with their enemies, and turned their ſwords againſt themſelves.----In one particular I cannot find a parallel; I know not any inſtance where thoſe unfortunate wretches, who had eſcaped maſſacre by flying from a faction

(12) The proceſs was called γραφη παρανομων or *indictment for illegality*—thus Demoſthenes propoſed a law equalizing the taxes as to ſhip-money and proportioning them to the revenues of each individual. It paſſed and was carried into execution: it was found however too favourable to the poor, and he was indicted by the rich.---In like manner if he had moved and obtained a law favourable to the rich, he was liable to an indictment by the poor.—This kind of trial appears to have been common. There are many inſtances of it in the orations of Demoſthenes.

(13) Sparta and Athens involved Greece in war and miſery; there was no reſpite from their broils except when both were oppreſſed by the Perſians.---The ſyſtem of the Spartans was a reſtraint of natural appetites and a perverſion of moral ſentiments, in order by becoming complete maſters of themſelves (and having nothing they feared to loſe or others could wiſh to gain) to acquire dominion over the whole human race.---If wolves or tygers had the wiſdom of the Lacedemonians and wiſhed to render more voracious their keen reliſh for blood, for the purpoſe of devouring all inferior animals, they would adopt the principles of the Spartan Republick.

faction at home, were butchered by their fellow-citizens on their return (14).

A popular aſſembly in Athens baniſhed Themiſtocles, impriſoned Miltiades, who died in a dungeon of the wounds he received in defence of his country; drove into exile Ariſtides; becauſe they could not bear to hear him called, "Ariſtides the juſt." It was inconſiſtent with principles of equality. For the ſame reaſon the court of Areopagus poiſoned Socrates (15).

A popular aſſembly in Paris plundered their clergy, degraded their nobility, diſbanded their generals, and murdered their king (16).----An unſucceſsful general, who

(14) An Areopagite was puniſhed for killing a ſparrow which to eſcape the purſuit of a hawk had taken ſhelter in his boſom.

(15) The accuſation of Socrates was about two years after the reſtoration of the Democracy, upon the expulſion of the thirty Tyrants, impoſed by Spartan liberty on Athenian freedom.—— The accuſers of Socrates were a junto of a few; but of the Court of Areopagus which then conſiſted of 300, no leſs than 281 voted for his death.---See Potter's Antiq. b. 1. ch. 19.---And the people having diſcovered his innocence ſhortly after his conviction; imputed all the misfortunes of the republick to his unjuſt condemnation; expreſſed their ſorrow and repentance; and to avert the vengeance of Heaven, condemned his accuſers.

(16) They were not ſatisfied with this; they laboured to incite other nations to the ſame outrages---but their day is near

——— and even-handed juſtice
returns the ingredients of their poiſoned chalice
to their own lips.

who dares to remonſtrate with the ſovereign people, and to tell them, they are not invincible, is guilty of treaſon againſt their ambition; and a virtuous King is a living libel upon equality.

A popular aſſembly in Athens disfranchiſed 5000 of their fellow citizens, confiſcated their property, and condemned them to perpetual ſlavery, having ſold them in a publick market---hear the reaſon--- a king of Egypt ſent the Athenian people a donation of corn; the number of citizens was then near 20,000; (17) they quarrelled about the diviſion of it, as there was not enough for them all; they hit upon an expedient; the majority decreed one-fourth of the citizens illegitimate, whoſe legitimacy had never been queſtioned before---there was corn ſufficient for the reſt.

A popular aſſembly in Paris confiſcated property of their fellow-citizens to the amount of 192 millions ſterling; disfranchiſed the owners, who had fled from maſſacre, and condemned them to perpetual baniſhment and death in caſe they returned. And wherefore? This aſſembly had declared war againſt the whole world; of courſe they had no credit; and they wanted reſources

It would be endleſs to recite the various parallel inſtances to ſhew that the ſpirit of all popular govern-

(17) This was in the time of Pericles, when the number of ſtrangers in Athens was about 10,000, and the ſlaves amounted to 400,000 and upwards.---See Plutarch's life of Pericles, and Athenæus lib. 6. cap. 20.

ments is the ſame, from the hiſtory of the republicks, of Rome, Sparta, Athens, Syracuſe, Corcyra, Carthage, Florence (the epitome of Athens,) &c. and that where they acted with wiſdom or moderation, it was owing to a ſtate of adverſity, or war, which kept them united. "It is the bright day that brings "forth the adder." In a democracy, peace is the birth of faction, and proſperity its cradle.----When the fever riſes to its height the only remedy is letting blood by maſſacre at home, or war abroad;---if the people are victorious, the fever returns again, and the ſame remedies muſt be applied (18).

A democratick republick is the worſt poſſible form of government; becauſe the ſupreme legiſlative and executive powers are delegated by the people at large to the ſame perſons as their truſtees, unleſs they act for themſelves (19); in either caſe any artful man has a power of turning againſt each individual the collected ſtrength of the whole. A ſingle tyrant may be cruſhed; but where is the reſource when the people

(18) I have not mentioned America.---I do not wiſh to predict evil of any country and I ſhall only ſay that it conſiſts of 13 different republicks, that the inhabitants are farmers and planters not philoſophers, and therefore the conſtitution has outlived nine years, but America has not yet arrived at proſperity.

(19) It is a glorious part of our conſtitution that when the rigour of law has convicted the criminal, if there ſhould appear circumſtances which compaſſion for human frailty might ſay extenuate or palliate his guilt, "an appeal lies from juſtice to the judgment ſeat of mercy," in the royal prerogative—this never can be the caſe where the legiſlative, judicial, and executive powers are veſted in the ſame perſon.

ple are deſpots over each other; enflamed by the bitterneſs of retaliation, and the mercileſs policy of fear? When the remedy is in the hands, not of thoſe who feel the diſorder, but of thoſe who cauſe the diſorder?

"Th' abuſe of greatneſs is when it disjoins
"Remorſe from power."-----

and therefore, no tyranny is ſo hopeleſs as that exerciſed by the majority over the minority.

What ſecurity can the *fixed reſident* in a country have more ſtrong, for the permanency of every enjoyment, than a government formed by thoſe whoſe permanent, not tranſient intereſt it is, to eſtabliſh the beſt inſtitutions moſt productive of human happineſs?----What ſecurity can the *ſtranger* and *ſojourner* in a country require more ſtrong than the protection of the moſt advantageous government inſtituted by the few for ſelf-preſervation?---What ſecurity can *man* require from *man* againſt a ſyſtem of power, and for the enjoyment of equal liberty, and the eſtabliſhment of that into which all the laws of nature may be reſolved----the common good.----more ample than this---that he ſhall not be bound, except by ſuch laws as ſhall be made by perſons whoſe intereſt it is to make the beſt laws; that he ſhall not be ſubject to any law which the law-maker is not ſubject to obey; and that he ſhall be entitled to the protection of

every

every law which the poſſeſſor of power ſhall make for his own protection, extended to him and to all (20).

The panegyriſts of ancient governments tell us every thing but what is requiſite to be known. They ſay the people poſſeſſed more liberty and power, but they do not inform us whether they were better ſecured and better protected by ſuch liberty and power in the enjoyments and comforts of exiſtence; in all things which have a tendency to bleſs or to adorn life, without which protection, power is an inſtrument of evil, and liberty a curſe. They tell us they poſſeſſed the means, but they do not inform us whether they enjoyed the end. Were the "bonds of amity, the ties of

(20) If the matter was conſidered in this ſimple light, perhaps many objections might be removed.——I, a non-proprietor wiſh to obtain a voice in making laws, or in chuſing delegates to make laws for the community in which I live—becauſe I know my own wiſdom and my own integrity—but if I obtain ſuch power all other perſons of the ſame deſcription in life with myſelf whether poſſeſſed of wiſdom and integrity or not, (if unimpeached) muſt have the ſame power—now, though I wiſh for political power, there is ſomething I wiſh for much more, that is to acquire one day permanent property in the community.—Suppoſe I had by my induſtry and labours riſen to the rank of a permanent proprietor, could I think my permanent landed property *more* ſecure by raiſing my preſent companions in indigence, who I know have not the wiſdom or integrity which I poſſeſs, to the power of governing and diſpoſing of ſuch acquiſitions, before they had by their induſtry acquired any property or common intereſt with myſelf (as a counter-ſecurity to me) in things of like nature?——is wiſdom beſet with temptations better qualified to govern her own?—or can ſhe becauſe leſs qualified to govern her own become entitled to what ſhe could not claim though free from temptations—a right to govern the poſſeſſions of others?

of blood," the mutual ſureties of ſocial intercourſe more perfect in their obligation? Were "the ſmall, yet ſweet curteſies of life" better known, or more highly cultivated? Were the pleaſures of ſenſe more rational, or the pleaſures of intellect more refined?--Was property, (the great object of ſociety) more ſecure in the acquiſition, in the poſſeſſion, or in the tranſfer? Theſe are the teſts of a well-ordered ſociety; and the conſtitution or ſociety which has not theſe in view, ſacrifices the end to the means. To what purpoſe do we drudge through the toils and labours of a laborious occupation or profeſſion, but in the confidence that we ſhall be able to tranſmit the fruits of our labours inviolate to our children? In the certainty of this hope, the father of a numerous offspring, though "broken with the ſtorms of fate," or bowed down by the weight of years; feels his vigour renewed, and in the proſpect of their future welfare, lives over his days again. What is there in human life without theſe things? What is there indeed in human life more to be enjoyed than theſe things? And what is that ſociety or form of government which affects to deſpiſe them? If property or the law or conſtitution which govern property be at the diſpoſal of the multitude, to what end do we toil or labour or live?---If when my eyes are cloſed, cries the aged father of a family, graſping the hands of his children, "the hard-earned labours of my youth, inſtead of providing for you, ſhall ſupply the wants of the idle, the diſſipated, or the unfortunate who have no property; bet-

ter would it have been for me to have retired to a ſtate of nature, where my children might, in ſome unoccupied part of the earth have been inured by their labour, to acquire a proviſion for themſelves, than relying on the fruits of my induſtry, to be left deſtitute of ſupport when they ſtand moſt in need of protection." Is this the boaſted bleſſing of ſociety, that, in a moment, the multitude, whoſe will is a "breath ſubject to all the ſkiey influences," may, by that ſovereign will, overturn the government, and deſtroy the conſtitution, by whoſe laws are protected the labours of ſo many years? Have I contributed to ſupport ſociety for this? If ſo, the laſt advice I give you my children is, abandon ſuch ſociety; renounce its deluſive hopes; and retire to ſome deſolate ſpot: Wolves and Tygers cannot treat you worſe than man, and your children will not be brought up in the cruel deluſion of poſſeſſing a property, which it is in the power of a capricious multitude in a moment to take from you.

Thus might he have reaſoned--and thus, may it pleaſe your Majeſty, have I reaſoned and laboured to convince your ſubjects; to expoſe their errors; and to warn them of the miſchiefs into which their falſe guides endeavour to lead them. I have cried aloud to them to beware of deceivers who perſuade them to ſpurn thoſe humble bleſſings and comforts which are within their graſp and ſuitable to their condition, in order to indulge in fantaſtic dreams, wandering through regions of gigantic

gantic ſhadows in purſuit of what is falſely called liberty, unaccompanied with the proſpect of one ſolid, certain advantage. But my voice was drowned in the clamours of ſeducers againſt ſeduction, deſpots againſt deſpotiſm, and corruptors againſt corruption; innumerable hoſts of ſycophants and flatterers hovering conſtantly round, and with the *fraternal kiſs* of Judas endeavouring to betray and ſell them.

With all due allegiance therefore to your Majeſty's empire, I hold that the rightful and legitimate power of a people in their original character, the bonds of a former ſubſiſting government being diſſolved, is only the power of the proprietors of the country or the land-holders; and that the multitude in ſuch countries have no title, or right, or intereſt, except in the common protection of a ſociety where laws are equal for all, but that their ſovereign *power* muſt be as part of the people of the earth over unoccupied territories, and not over property appropriated by others (21.)

This

(21) *Non nobis ſolum nati ſumus*—is a maxim true in politics and in morals—but the tacit inference that on the breach of this maxim, a right of reſiſtance accrues, is falſe both in morals and in politicks—the tranſlation as a political maxim ſtands thus—the proprietors in a country ought not to uſe their power individually for their own immediate intereſts; if they do, they deſerve and will meet with puniſhment in the act. Their property and power will melt within the graſp. The proprietors ought to uſe their power ſo as to beſtow the greateſt encouragement on permanent reſidence, and to throw the greateſt diſcouragement upon tranſitory reſidence, by giving

power

This I hold to be the true political faith, all other creeds are the hereſies of tyranny, and the magna-charta of deſpotiſm which at one time ſubjects the rights of the many to the power of the few, and at another, the rights of the few to the power of the many.

" Thus every thing includes itſelf in power;
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite (an univerſal wolf
So doubly ſeconded with will and power)
Muſt make perforce an univerſal prey
And laſt eat up itſelf."

That your Majeſty's empire may long ſubſiſt free from ſuch " anarchy and wild miſ-rule" is the ardent and humble prayer of

Your Majeſty's moſt devoted

and loyal ſubject.

power only to the former, and protection only to the latter; by encouraging all as candidates in the race, but beſtowing the prize on the perſevering victor alone—but if thoſe who have a right only to protection are taught that they have a right to reſiſtance upon not obtaining a participation in power; it is the moſt abominable ſyſtem of *immorality* that ever yet was framed; it is no leſs than to truſt the ſanction of the laws of nature to blind erring partial man—— to man accuſer and judge in his own cauſe.——" *We are not born for ourſelves alone*"——true——but if nature has given wealth and proſperity to the individual and the unworthy poſſeſſor draws tighter the ſtrings of his purſe and of his heart—ſhall *man* tear them aſunder?—will it be leſs ſafe to truſt nature herſelf with the vindication of her laws? or is ſhe incompetent without the aid of blind, erring, partial man?

FINIS.

BRITISH MUSEUM 20 JAN 55